CYOHA: What if the Soviets attempted a spoiling attack in the lead-up to Barbarossa?

In May and June of 1941, as Germany moved through their final preparations for the launch of their invasion of the Soviet Union, alarm bells continued to ring in the Kremlin, both from Soviet intelligence agencies as well as external warnings from the British, but Stalin refused to listen. As early as mid-May, Zhukov was calling for secret mobilization to try and attack first and blunt the German onslaught, but this was soundly rejected, and even in the very final days, when the evidence was overwhelming, Stalin remained obstinate and rejected mobilization plans even for a stronger defensive footing which might antagonize the Germans.

The end result of course was the Soviet forces being caught completely unprepared, and effective resistance quite limited for the first several months, finally, and conclusively blunting the opening campaign only at the gates of Moscow. But of course, other decisions might have been made too, and seen the situation play out quite differently.

If presented with such a scenario, what plan for preparation would you choose:

A) Zhukov’s presentation of 15 May is accepted. The clear threat of a German invasion is made plain, and Stalin is convinced not only to act, but that to act first is the best move. The orders go out, mobilization is to begin, and then to war.

B) Stalin remains leery, but by early June he is convinced of the German strike. Full mobilization is ordered but nevertheless wary of the unpreparedness for the Red Army for offensive operations, they nevertheless are geared to a defensive arrangement, but one ready and waiting for the German attack.